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Petitioner, Anthony S. Earle, hereby replies to those 
new matters raised in the brief of respondent• 
POINT I 
THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE MATTERS 
RAISED BY PETITIONER, 
Through procedural arguments, the State encourages 
this Court to limit the scope of its review to very narrow 
technical issues. The State goes so far as to argue that this 
Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of 
Mr. Earle's arguments. The law is to the contrary. The 
Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over all extraordinary 
writs. U.C.A. § 78-2-2(2) and Constitution of Utah, Art. VIII 
§ 3. This includes Writs for Habeus Corpus. Rule 65B(a), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. And, while Habeus Corpus is not a 
substitute for appellate review, it is available "where the 
requirements of law have been so disregarded that the party is 
substantially and effectively denied due process of law, or 
where some such fact is shown that it would be unconscionable 
not to re-examine the conviction." Wells v. Shulsen, 747 
P.2d 1043 (Utah 1987). A quick review of the procedural 
background of this case demonstrates the utter disregard of 
Mr. Earle's constitutionally protected rights to effective 
counsel and to a valid plea process. 
After Mr. Earle's motion to withdraw his guilty plea 
was denied by the trial court on April 2, 1984, he was left 
without the aid of counsel to pursue any remedy he might have 
had. Proceeding pro se, Mr. Earle has attempted numerous 
times to present the merits of his case to various courts. He 
filed two Habeus Corpus Petitions, one in August of 1987, and 
one in August of 1988. Both were dismissed on procedural 
technicalities. Still proceeding pro se. Mr. Earle 
attempted to appeal the dismissal of his Habeus Corpus 
Petitions, but the Court of Appeals dismissed, also on 
procedural technicalities. He then filed a Motion to Reinstate 
the Appeal, but the Court of Appeals denied it and remitted the 
matter to the District Court. 
The inadequacy of those proceedings was the explicit 
focus of Mr. Earle,s Petition for Writ of Certiorari to this 
Court. The filing of that Petition on August 3, 1989, was 
followed shortly on August 10, 1989, by Mr. Earle7s 14-page 
pleading entitled "Mandamus." That pleeiding further detailed 
the technical and substantive errors in the trial court and in 
the various Habeus Corpus proceedings and in the Court of 
Appeals7 review. The State never responded to either the 
Petition for Certiorari or the Mandamus pleading. Mr. Earle's 
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Petition was granted by this Court without limitation or 
qualification on October 26, 1989. 
Now, after the law and the prior proceedings have 
been exhaustively reviewed and briefed, the State once again 
seeks a technical victory on issues which it could have and 
should have raised a year ago in response to the Petition for 
Certiorari. The State's "shell game" approach to Mr. Earle's 
case is deplorable. Each of the cases cited in Point I of the 
State's responsive brief to support a technical application of 
appellate review are cases involving civil matters where 
parties were represented by active counsel on issues not 
involving Constitutional liberties. Surely, the sanctity of 
Constitutional rights warrants a less casual approach than the 
one now urged by the State. 
From the time Anthony Earle entered his invalid 
guilty plea, he has attempted to argue the Constitutional flaws 
surrounding the plea and the inadequacy of his legal 
representation. He has done this without the aid of counsel, 
and without any legal training or experience of his own. To 
date, no court has addressed the merits of his claims. The key 
facts are not in dispute. The record below has been tediously 
reconstructed. The legal standards have been clearly briefed. 
The time is ripe for adjudication on the merits. Justice cries 
for a substantive evaluation of whether this human being's 
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rights were or were not properly accorded by the courts of 
Utah. 
POINT II 
PETITIONER WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
The parties agree that Utah has adopted the two-prong 
test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984) for assessing ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims. State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989). That test 
requires a showing that counsel "rendered a deficient 
performance in some demonstrable manner and 'that a reasonable 
probability exists that except for ineffective counsel, the 
result would have been different.'" Id. at 118. 
With regard to the first prong, the State now argues 
that Mr. Earle has not proven the substandard performance of 
his various counsel. This argument asks an incarcerated 
prisoner to do what is nigh impossible under even normal civil 
circumstances — to prove the negative. It should be enough 
for a defendant to plead his counsel's lack of investigation, 
lack of a Bill of Particulars, lack of procedural motions on 
evidence and witnesses, lack of alibi witnesses, lack of 
information on proper plea practices, lack of appeal, and lack 
of assistance. If those tasks were performed, the State should 
be able to easily demonstrate them by the record. But the 
State can't prove effective counsel by the record because no 
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defense pleadings or filings were ever made by any of 
Mr. Earle's three different attorneys. 
The record does show that Mr. Earle wanted an 
evidentiary hearing from the trial court on the effectiveness 
of his trial counsel. The request was denied. He wanted a 
hearing on the propriety of the plea bargain. The record shows 
only that the trial court reviewed the short transcript of its 
prior hearing and simply compounded its former error. The 
trial court advised Mr. Earle of his counsels, Mr. Kuramada's, 
abilities on appeal, but there wasn't one. 
The State now argues that Mr. Earle had "legal savvy" 
because of the volume of pleadings he was able to file over the 
last six years, as if to suggest he was his own effective 
counsel. This won't do. It doesn't satisfy Strickland; and 
it cynically seeks to use a desperate man's thrashings to show 
that he really wasn't desperate, because he was still moving. 
Strickland requires the defendant to show that 
"counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness." Strickland. 466 U.S. at 687. While the 
opinion did not elaborate to a great degree on the guidelines 
counsel should be held to, it did state that counsel owes a 
client a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of 
interest, and a duty to consult with the defendant on important 
decisions. Id. at 688. This includes a duty to make 
reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that 
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makes particular investigations unnecessary. Id. at 691. 
These same duties are required by Utah Code Annotated § 77-32-1 
(Repl. 1990): 
The following are minimum standards to be 
provided by each county, city and town for 
the defense of indigent persons in criminal 
cases in the courts of various 
administrative bodies of the state: 
(1) Provide counsel for every indigent 
person who faces the substantial 
probability of the depravation of his 
liberty; 
(2) Afford timely representation by 
competent legal counsel; 
(3) Provide the investigatory and other 
facilities necessary for a complete defense; 
(4) Assure undivided loyalty of defense 
counsel to the client; and 
(5) Include the taking of the first appeal 
of right and the prosecuting of other 
remedies before or after a conviction, 
considered by the defending counsel to be 
in the interest of justice except for other 
and subsequent discretionary appeals or 
discretionary writ proceedings. 
In State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d 203, 204 (1976), this 
court stated: 
The right of the accused to have counsel is 
not satisfied by a sham or pretense of an 
appearance in the record by an attorney who 
manifests no real concern about the 
interest of the accused. He is entitled to 
the assistance of a competent member of the 
Bar, who shows a willingness to identify 
himself with the interest of the accused 
and present such defenses as are available 
under the law and consistent with the 
ethics of the profession. 
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Let the State show what was done by any of Mr. Earle's three 
court-appointed attorneys, other than to stand by his side at 
numerous hearings and to facilitate the process of arraignment, 
guilty plea, and sentencing. Mr. Earle has shown 
ineffectiveness of counsel by the complete absence of a record 
to support active, involved representation. To be sure, the 
evidence is circumstantial. But it is no less conclusive than 
the proverbial stretch of beach with no footprints in the 
sand. 
The second prong of Strickland is that the result 
would have been different if counsel had performed to a 
reasonable standard. 466 U.S. at 119. The State doesn't want 
this Court to even reach this inquiry because Mr. Earle has 
made it abundantly clear that if he had been properly 
represented and advised he would not have entered a guilty 
plea. All Mr. Earle wants is the State to have to prove its 
case on a level playing field and with a full roster of 
players on each side. The law requires it. The State must 
provide it. The time for it is long overdue. 
POINT III 
THE RECORD AS A WHOLE SHOWS PETITIONER DID NOT KNOWINGLY 
AND VOLUNTARILY ENTER HIS GUILTY PLEA. 
Even under the "record as a whole" standard it is 
clear that petitioner did not knowingly or voluntarily enter 
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his guilty plea. The state acknowledges that the plea 
affidavit contained "only a sketch of the elements and facts." 
The plea affidavit did not clearly list the elements of the 
crimes to which defendant plead guilty or the possibility that 
the Mr. Earle could be subjected to two 1 to 15 year 
sentences. 
Not only was the plea affidavit ambiguous, but the 
discussion by the trial court with Mr. Earle was far from 
adequate to establish that he understood the possible 
sentences, the elements of crimes charged, and the facts to 
which he was pleading guilty. The only time the trial court 
even approached the elements and facts was in conclusory 
references to the defective affidavit. When asked if he 
understood what he was pleading guilty to, it was Mr. Earle's 
attorney who answered. Counsel's statements cannot bind 
Mr. Earle. A trial court cannot rely on the representations of 
counsel when assessing a defendant's knowledgeable and 
voluntary entry of a guilty plea. State v. Vasilacopulous, 
756 P.2d 92 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) cert, denied 765 P.2d 
1278. In Vasilacopulous the court applied the "record as a 
whole" standard and held that a defendant's statement that he 
had gone over the plea affidavit with his attorney and 
understood the contents of the affidavit did not mean that he 
knowingly and voluntarily entered the guilty plea and 
understood the possibility of consecutive terms. Id. 
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The State cannot assume that Mr. Earle understood and 
voluntarily entered the guilty plea just because he had been to 
preliminary hearings where details of the crimes were 
discussed. There is no law to support this care-free 
suggestion by the State. Even if the charged crimes were the 
same ones Mr. Earle pled guilty to, circumstantial evidence 
cannot to satisfy the requirements of Rule 11(e). 
In State v. Branch. 743 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1987) 
cert, denied, 485 U.S. 1036 (1988), the court determined 
that unless there is evidence demonstrating involuntariness, 
pleas are presumed to have been voluntary. .Id. at 1192. 
However, a defendant can overcome this presumption by 
presenting some evidence of involuntariness. Id. at 
1192-93. This evidence shifts the burden back to the State to 
demonstrate voluntariness. Mr. Earle has demonstrated that his 
plea was not voluntarily entered, so it should now be vacated 
and he should be returned for trial on the merits. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING 
MR, EARLE'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA. 
In response to this issue on appeal, the State claims 
that Mr. Earle never filed a motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea. (Brief at p. 31). However, earlier in its Brief the 
State admits that such a motion was made. (Brief at p. 7). 
The fact of the motion to withdraw is what caused the 
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District Court to reconsider its initial dismissal of 
Mr. Earle's first Habeus Corpus Petition. The absence of a 
formal pleading entitled "Motion to Withdraw" cannot obscure 
the facts as they appear in the trial court transcripts. The 
State ought to be more careful in its reliance on 
hyper-technicalities. 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-13-6 (Repl. 1982) provides 
in part that "[a] plea of guilty . . . may be withdrawn only 
upon good cause shown and with leave of the court." In State 
v. Vasilcopulous, 756 P.2d 92, 95 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), the 
court held that the defendant had shown good cause when he 
established he did not enter a knowing and voluntary plea of 
guilty. Vasilacopulous further held that the trial court 
abused its discretion by not granting the defendant's motion to 
withdraw the guilty plea. In the present case, the trial 
court's denial of Mr. Earle's Motion to Withdraw his guilty 
plea was also an abuse of discretion. The trial court's 
refusal to allow withdrawal should be reversed, and the case 
should be remanded for trial on the merits. 
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